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In the paper, the authors study the collapse of credit ratings of ABS CDOs, which played an 
instrumental role in how the recent financial crisis begun and spread throughout the global 
financial system.  Large exposures to the super senior tranches have crippled several large 
well-known banks insurance companies. 
 
In this discussion I tackle four topics: 
 
  Why did ABS CDO ratings perform so badly? 
  Is it plausible that issuers of ABS CDOs shopped for ratings? 
  What do the authors contribute? 
  What does my own research suggest about credit ratings shopping? 
 
1.  Why did ABS CDO ratings perform so badly? 
 
The authors do an excellent job highlighting the scale and scope of CDO downgrades in the 
paper.  However, in order to understand why the models performed so badly, it is important to 
understand the how model employed by the credit rating agencies actually works.  
 
At a high level, Moody’s CDO model transforms a portfolio of 100 to 125 bonds into a 
smaller portfolio of statistically independent bonds, using a measure of portfolio correlation called a diversity score.  A portfolio with less correlation has a higher diversity score.  
Portfolio defaults are projected using probabilities of default implied by the rating on the 
underlying collateral, and correlation is implied through the use of fewer bonds than exist in 
the reference portfolio.  Using a simple binomial distribution and an assumption about loss 
given default, it is straightforward to simulate a loss distribution.  For ABS CDOs, which had 
large concentrations of subprime and Alt-A MBS, the diversity score under the traditional 
methodology was very low, which made the loss distribution very lumpy and obviously 
difficult to tranche finely.  In response, Moodys developed its correlated binomial model 
which essentially added a parameter in order to smooth out the loss distribution. 
 
In the paper, the authors focus on excessive correlation when describing the failure of CDO 
ratings.  In particular, they note a high concentration of residential housing, high exposure to 
risky residential housing, and low inter-vintage diversification.  While I do not disagree with 
these assertions, I believe the fundamental problem was correlation created by model error in 
the ratings of underlying ABS collateral.  The most significant model error, of course, was 
that the credit rating agencies underestimated the severity of the housing downturn.  Housing 
markets were historically local, but securitization created correlation which did not previously 
exist.  In a diversified pool, idiosyncratic risk is diversified away, leaving only systematic 
risk, and the accuracy of credit ratings will depend significantly on the accuracy of the 
forecast of systematic risk factors.  In the case of MBS ratings, home prices are clearly the 
most important systematic risk factor. 
 However, there were additional honest mistakes discussed in CGFS (2008).  For example, the 
use of limited historical data which did not permit one to accurately measure how loans with 
risk-layering would behave in financial distress.  Moreover, they did not adequately account 
for the originator risk factor permitting the arbitrage of rating criteria by weak originators.  
Finally, they ignored the refinancing stress risk factor, never anticipated the complete 
evaporation of refinancing opportunities.    
 
2.  Is it plausible that issuers of ABS CDOs shopped for credit ratings? 
 
As pointed out in a recent note by Adelson and Jacob (2008), the onset of ABS CDOs helped 
to obscure model errors in the underlying MBS bond ratings to the ultimate investors.  Until 
1997 the vast majority of subprime RMBS used bond insurance from monolines as credit 
enhancement. However, from 1997 to 2002, about half of deals used bond insurance and the 
other half used subordination as credit enhancement.   In 2004, ABS CDOs and CDO 
investors became the dominant class of agents pricing credit risk on subprime RMBS, 
displacing bond insurers and other sophisticated investors.  This was important because CDO 
investors were willing to accept loans that traditional investors would not have accepted, and 
originators began originating riskier and riskier loans.  The willingness of CDO tranche 
investors to accept weaker collateral was created by overconfidence in models by the traders 
and risk managers of the trading books of several banks. 
 
ABS CDO structures were typically structures as "hybrids", where the underlying collateral 
was a mix of cash MBS bonds and credit derivatives (CDS) on MBS bonds.  In the latter, the CDO sold credit insurance through on reference ABS bonds to hedge funds who had a 
negative credit view on the underlying collateral, and profited handsomely as it began to 
deteriorate in early 2007.  In a hybrid ABS CDO, an unfunded super senior tranche rated Aaa 
was either retained off-balance sheet by the issuer or hedged with financial guarantors, and 
only the junior part of the CDO capital structure was funded.  These junior tranches included 
a cash Aaa tranche, lower-rated mezzanine tranches, and an equity tranche.  The cash Aaa 
tranche was sold to ratings-dependent foreign investors, lower-rated mezzanine tranches were 
re-securitized into CDO-squared transactions, and equity tranches were sold to hedge funds.     
 
The phenomenon of credit ratings shopping is the idea that competition between credit rating 
agencies might have the undesirable outcome of reducing the amount of credit enhancement 
required to attain a given.  In the example explored in the paper, investors require only one 
credit rating, but issuers can choose between three.  Generally, one might be concerned that 
the issuer would choose the credit rating agency with the least amount of required credit 
enhancement.  The other rating agencies would not rate deals, and lose market share, which 
would create obvious pressure to relax their standards. 
 
Turning to ABS CDOs, it seems difficult to suggest that ratings shopping played an important 
role when focusing on the super senior tranches, as these were generally either the issuers or 
fairly sophisticated investors.  My view is that the only scope for ratings shopping in this asset 
class would have been with respect to the credit enhancement of the cash Aaa tranche.  
Consequently, I would advise the authors to focus the analysis of any evidence of ratings shopping at this point in the capital structure, and to use the other tranches as a falsification 
exercise. 
 
3.  What do the authors contribute? 
 
The authors have a data set of 30,499 tranches of bond collateral included in 534 ABS CDOs, 
which were owned by the hedge fund Pershing Square Capital Management at the time of the 
study.   
 
An immediate challenge with the paper is that the authors have data on the credit ratings of 
ABS collateral underlying CDOs, and do not appear to analyze data on credit ratings of CDO 
tranches.  Without data on the ratings of CDO tranches, it is simply not possible to study 
ratings shopping by CDO issuers.  In the conclusion to the paper, the authors note “Among 
534 ABS CDOs issued between 2005 and 2007, we find that tranches rated by solely one 
agency, and by S&P in particular, were more likely to be downgraded by January 2008.”  
However, it would be more accurate to write, “Across various collateral types and vintages 
included in 534 ABS CDOs issued between 2005 and 2007, we find that ABS tranches rated 
by solely one agency, and by S&P in particular, were more likely to be downgraded by 
January 2008.”   
 
In Table 13, the authors have focused on the coefficient of there being a single credit rating.  
The first column is a Probit regression of downgrade frequency on dummies for one or two 
credit ratings, controlling for vintage and asset class fixed effects.  My view is that the first model is meaningless, as the omitted category includes both “No rating” as well as “Three 
raters.”  Strictly speaking, the coefficient on “One rater” suggests that a bond with one credit 
rating is 6.1 percentage points more likely to be downgraded than a bond with either no credit 
rating at all or a bond with three credit ratings.  The coefficient on “Two rater” is negative 
with a large standard error.  In principle, the authors should focus on the difference between 
the “One rater” and “Two rater” coefficients, as this is really the hypothesis of interest. 
 
In the second model, the authors are excluding either “No rating” or “Two ratings” which 
makes the coefficients difficult to interpret.  In particular, the coefficient implies that a bond 
with one credit rating is 7.5 percentage points more likely to be downgraded than a bond with 
either no credit rating or a bond with two credit ratings.  In general, the specification does not 
appear to be thought out very carefully. 
 
Ignoring these specification issues, there are some other potential problems with the approach 
which need to be addressed.  While the impact of one credit rating might be statistically 
significant, it is not clear that it is economically significant.  From Table 10, over the entire 
period only 6 percent of credit ratings were by a single firm, and this number was actually 
decreasing from 2004 to 2007.  Consequently, it does not seem that “one rating” could have 
been an important part of the credit rating crisis. Moreover, the authors may be too eager to 
interpret a higher frequency of downgrade as evidence of inflated ratings.  In particular, there 
is no serious attempt to control for deal-level characteristics which would mitigate obvious 
selection concerns.  In lieu of such data, it would be prudent to break out the results by asset class, vintage, original rating in order to document the robustness of the results, and to 
identify differences where one might expect credit ratings shopping to be more severe. 
 
4.  What does my own work suggest about credit ratings shopping? 
 
A recent paper with colleagues investigates the efficacy of credit ratings on subprime and Alt-
A mortgagebacked securities (MBS) deals issued between 2001 and 2007, the period leading 
up to the subprime crisis. We document evidence that conditional on credit ratings, projected 
mortgage delinquency rates from a simple loan-level econometric model are strongly 
correlated with ex-post default, suggesting ratings did not fully reflect information on 
mortgage risk available at deal origination. While these results hold throughout our sample, 
they are strongest for deals issued at the peak of the mortgage boom (2005-2007), and for 
deals with a high fraction of low-documentation mortgages and investor loans.   Further, we 
document an increasing level of subordination below AAA over the sample period, consistent 
with rating agencies increasing rating conservatism in response to 
increasing risk. However, we find that assigned subordination conditional on fundamentals 
declined by about 20% in the last part of our sample (between mid- 
2005 and mid-2007) in both subprime and Alt-A.  
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